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Why we build local-first software

There was a time when installing software was wonderfully uneventful. You put it on your computer, opened it, and got to work. Nobody asked for a selfie, your birthday, your mobile number, or permission to send you a six-digit code just so you could organize a few files.

Today, opening an application can feel like applying for a passport. Create an account, confirm your email, add a phone number, accept a new policy, prove you're human, and possibly tell a camera what your face looks like. By the time you're allowed to do the thing you came to do, you've forgotten why you opened the app in the first place.

We build local-first software because we think this relationship has become backward. A customer should be able to use a useful tool without surrendering a small biography to its maker. And the company providing that tool should remember an old-fashioned principle: service means serving the customer, not treating the customer as the product.

How software became a service you keep paying for

From a program on your desk to an account in somebody else's system

In the 1990s, much of the software people used arrived on disks or CDs and ran on their own machines. You might buy an upgrade later, and you might need support, but the program generally wasn't waiting for a remote server to approve your Monday morning. Software was something you installed, rather than a relationship you had to keep renewing.

Then internet connections improved, browsers became more capable, and software companies discovered they could deliver whole applications online. That approach became known as Software as a Service, or SaaS. Instead of installing and managing a program, you access a hosted service, commonly by logging in and paying a recurring fee.

There are legitimate reasons this happened. Hosted software can make collaboration easier, deliver updates without a manual installation, and help businesses avoid running their own servers. For some work, especially when people in different places need to use the same information, these are substantial benefits rather than marketing fluff.

But follow the money, too

Let's not pretend the transition was only about making everyone's life more convenient. Recurring subscriptions create predictable income, and predictable income is enormously attractive to businesses and investors. Once a company has that steady revenue stream, the pressure to grow it can start shaping everything from pricing to product design.

Instead of asking only, “How do we make this tool better?”, a company may also ask, “How do we get more people enrolled, keep them enrolled, and move them to a higher-priced plan?” That is a rational business incentive, but it isn't automatically the customer's interest. Sometimes a feature that makes a spreadsheet easier to use is less exciting to the balance sheet than a feature that makes it harder to leave. Customers notice when that happens.

Venture capital didn't invent subscriptions, and not every SaaS company is backed by investors. Many subscription businesses provide excellent service and need recurring fees to pay for real operating costs. Still, the promise of recurring revenue is a major reason SaaS became such an appealing business model, and customers are entitled to ask whether the bargain remains fair.

When convenience starts to feel like dependence

Imagine a carpenter whose hammer checks with a company server before each swing. If the internet goes down, the hammer takes the afternoon off, and if the subscription expires, it suggests upgrading to the Professional Hammer Plan. Nobody would call that progress, although the dashboard showing your weekly nail usage would probably look lovely.

Online software is not literally a hammer, of course, and many services genuinely need a network connection. But plenty of ordinary tasks can be performed locally without an ongoing conversation with a server. When a tool could work without a login or internet connection, it is fair to ask why those requirements are there.

Why does this app need to know who I am?

An email address is not a free admission ticket

Some services need to know your identity, and some must verify it because of fraud prevention, contractual obligations, or the law. Banking, financial services, and certain regulated activities can have meaningful identification requirements. We are not arguing that companies should ignore those responsibilities.

But does a simple utility need your legal name, date of birth, mobile number, and photograph? Does it need your address to remember the width of a column? If the answer is no, collecting that information can create risk without creating much value for the person using the software.

Every additional detail has a cost that isn't printed on the signup screen. It may be stored, copied into another system, shared with a service provider, retained longer than expected, or exposed in a future security incident. Information a company never collects is information it cannot lose in a breach of its own records.

We love security. We don't love unnecessary identity collection.

Strong authentication is good, and we welcome two-factor authentication when accounts and sensitive systems need protection. But “secure your account” should not automatically mean “give us your mobile number.” A phone number is personal information, not a magical shield against criminals. It can become one more valuable piece of information for someone else to steal.

There are alternatives. Authenticator apps can generate time-based codes without sending a text message to your number, while hardware security keys and passkeys can offer stronger protection against phishing. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST, treats SMS-based authentication as a restricted method and recognizes phishing-resistant approaches such as cryptographic authenticators.

None of these choices is perfect, and different systems have different recovery and security needs. An authenticator app can still be tricked by a convincing phishing site, while passkeys and security keys require thoughtful setup and recovery. The point is simpler: asking for more personal information is not the same thing as providing more security.

Questions worth asking before clicking “Continue”

  • Why do you need this? Ask what each requested detail actually does for the service.
  • Is it required? Check whether a phone number, birth date, or photo is optional.
  • Can I use a safer sign-in method? Look for passkeys, security keys, or an authenticator app instead of SMS when supported.
  • What happens if I leave? Find out whether you can export your records in usable formats and delete unnecessary account data.
  • Does this task even need an account? Sometimes a program that runs on your computer is all you need.

Not every permission request is suspicious, and there is no universal answer for every type of software. What matters is whether the information collected is proportionate to the job being done. If a harmless little application wants to know more about you than your closest relatives do, asking why is perfectly reasonable.

Personal data breaches can leave the screen and enter real life

When criminals come looking for the person behind the wallet

Privacy is often discussed as though the worst possible outcome is an annoying advertisement following you around the internet. That's irritating, but personal information can have much more serious consequences when criminals link a real name, an address, and something worth stealing. Cryptocurrency holders have seen a disturbing example of what happens when digital wealth becomes a target in the physical world.

Security researchers call these incidents “wrench attacks,” a grim nickname for robberies in which criminals use threats or violence to force someone to hand over cryptocurrency. The attackers aren't necessarily trying to crack a password with clever software. They may instead identify the person holding the assets and go to that person's home.

In an August 2026 analysis, blockchain research company Chainalysis estimated that criminals stole $58 million through violent crypto-related attacks in 2025, the highest annual total in its dataset. It also estimated roughly $30 million stolen during the first half of 2026. Those are estimates of known successful attacks, not a count of all attempts, and the report cautioned that actual incidents may be underreported.

A home address is not just another database field

Chainalysis reported that home invasions represented 37% of documented violent crypto incidents in 2026, compared with 26% in 2023. It also described criminals targeting relatives and associates, rather than only the person who held the cryptocurrency. This is not a claim that most cryptocurrency owners face physical attacks; these crimes remain uncommon in absolute terms, but the documented pattern deserves attention.

How a criminal identifies a victim can vary widely. Public bragging about holdings, social media clues, leaked personal records, insider access, and other sources can all contribute to the picture. It would be irresponsible to suggest every attack began with a breached software company, because the evidence does not support that claim.

But the underlying lesson should make anyone think twice before handing over personal information casually. Once your real-world identity and location become connected to something valuable, you may have little say in who copies that connection or what they do with it later. A promise in a privacy policy cannot retrieve information after it has escaped into the wrong hands.

The danger isn't limited to Bitcoin

You don't have to own cryptocurrency to have something worth protecting. Addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers, account details, and identity documents can help criminals impersonate people, target families, or construct convincing fraud attempts. Some of those details are necessary in certain transactions, but giving them out should be a deliberate choice, not a reflex.

And even a company that takes security seriously cannot honestly promise that a breach will never happen. Secure engineering, access controls, encryption, and careful incident response matter enormously, yet risk never disappears entirely. Collecting less information reduces what is available to expose when something goes wrong.

Why we still believe in software that works like software

Your computer should be allowed to do its job

Local-first software starts with a straightforward idea: the application runs on your computer, and your working information stays there by default. You can use it without asking a distant server for permission every time you open it. When the internet is down, the program doesn't need to treat that as a personal crisis.

This approach is not a declaration that the internet is bad. Online collaboration, remote access, and hosted services solve real problems, and some products would make little sense without them. We simply don't believe every useful program needs to become a hosted subscription with an account attached.

There is an important trade-off, too. If your files live on your machine, you need to protect that machine and keep dependable backups; a failed drive can otherwise become your problem very quickly. Local storage does not automatically guarantee privacy or security, and careless software can still expose information or introduce vulnerabilities.

Bring back the idea of serving the customer

We remember the appeal of software that did one job well without asking to become part of your personal life. You opened it, used it, saved your work, and closed it. It did not need a birthday card relationship with you, much less; a selfie.

That is the philosophy behind why we build local-first at Skaynz. We believe people should be able to keep their files, move their records, work offline, and disclose only the information genuinely needed for a task. We also believe business success should follow from providing something useful, not from designing ever more ways to keep the customer paying or handing over data.

We aren't trying to rewind technology to 1995, and we aren't arguing that every SaaS provider has bad intentions. We want to recover something worth keeping from that era: the expectation that a tool works for the person using it.

Software should earn your trust through service, not demand your trust as the price of admission.